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Most research on parliamentary opposition focuses on constitutional and institutional 
aspects. This article argues that these approaches are limited in explaining differences 
between opposition parties. A case study of the Bavarian State Parliament, shows that there is 
support for the assumption that complex patterns of a number of factors, such as individual 
party groups’ ideology, history, their members’ socio-demographic background, and their 
informal rules of engagement, influence the way opposition parties behave. The study shows 
distinctive differences between the appearance and the strategies employed to influence the 
majority’s decision-making. The Social Democrats, a traditional mass party with over 40 
years in opposition, focused on a strategy of professional, subject-oriented co-operation 
within parliament. The Greens chose confrontational power policies that had their main effect 
outside parliament. This stands in line with the party’s origin in grassroots movements and its 
culture of conflict resolution. Those findings raise the question of how party identities and 
policies coincide with the preference of one opposition strategy over another and they 
contribute to the discussion of how parliamentary behaviour and representative roles are 
interwoven. 
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Introduction 
The article aims to advance understanding of opposition strategies by analysing them in a 
wider context considering the impact of the political system’s institutional and structural 
aspects, the representatives’ socio-demographic background, and party-specific aspects, such 
as a party group’s history and ideology, and its informal rules of engagement. 
Parliamentary opposition plays a central role within a functioning representative 
democracy. As a government in waiting, it scrutinizes and criticizes the political majority’s 
decisions and offers alternative policies and personnel to voters (Sternberger 1956, pp.134) 
with the overall aim of taking over power at some point. However, ever since Dahl’s (1966b) 
initial work on this topic his complaint, that this important aspect of parliamentary decision 
making remains under-researched, is still true. 
Recent work on parliamentary opposition even attributes the a-theoretical character of 
most research in this field to the “theory-resistance of its object of study” (Helms 2008, pp.7). 
This observation is puzzling in so far, as parliamentary opposition operates in a field that has 
been well examined both empirically and theoretically. Empirical research has started looking 
at parties’ policy preferences as one dimension of their opposition strategy (Kaiser 2008). 
Various strands of research, such as on legislative careers (Best & Cotta 2000b, Cotta & Best 
2007, Patzelt 1999) or legislative behaviour (Norton 1997, Müller et al. 2001) touch common 




Even though the performance of parliament as a whole is of imminent interest for the field 
of parliamentary and comparative studies, publications on opposition are rare (Helms 2008, 
Norton 2008). Theoretical work on opposition tends to focus on patterns of opposition within 
the political system as such (Dahl 1966a, Blondel 1997, Helms 2004) or is looking at 
opposition strategies in general (Kirchheimer 1980, Oberreuter 1975), assuming that – in 
order to take over power from government – opposition parties would have to behave 
somewhere along the three aspects of fundamental opposition, competition, and co-operation 
with the majority.1 
The impact of systems and institutions on parliamentary opposition 
In defining opposition’s appearance, characteristics, goals and strategies, Dahl (1966a) 
follows a rather static approach. He identifies four important system characteristics 
(organizational cohesion, competitiveness, site for the encounter between opposition and 
governing majority, the opposition’s distinctiveness) and looks at how the opposition’s goals 
and choice of sites combined with those characteristics to produce a specific choice of 
strategy (Dahl 1966a). In doing so, he focuses on the political system as such, linking the 
different characteristics to typical countries where such an opposition type might occur. Dahl 
acknowledges that opposition strategies and citizens’ attitude to opposing government 
policies are linked to a country’s political culture and influenced by societal cleavages (Dahl 
1966c, pp.352f.). However, he does not attribute them to specific parties within a system. 
Blondel (1997), who both simplifies Dahl’s theoretical concept and extends it beyond western 
democracies, shares this static approach. Despite calling for a stronger consideration of 
partisan matters when looking at the structure of opposition, Blondel (1997, pp.463) still sees 
opposition as “a ‘dependent’ concept” that is “tied to the character of the government”.  
Helms (2004, pp.24) explicitly points out “theoretical and analytical shortcomings of the 
comparative opposition literature”. Despite this observation, his contribution on this topic, 
which focuses on the constitutional level and describes five different types and forms of 
legitimate opposition to the government, again refers to specific countries (UK, Germany, 
Fifth French Republic, USA and Switzerland), instead of choosing an approach detached 
from constitutions and institutions. 
By referring exclusively to constitutional and institutional aspects of opposition, determined 
by a country’s political, party and electoral system, these authors elude the question of 
whether different kinds of parliamentary opposition, displayed by competing parties, might be 
visible within one political system.  
The impact of partisan and socio-demographic aspects  
Similar shortcomings exist when exploring how members of parliament behave, and whether 
their behaviour follows specific patterns. There has been considerable qualitative research on 
parliamentary behaviour in the past decades, most notably by Searing (1994) for the House of 
Commons and Patzelt (1997) for German MPs. It became evident that depending on their 
background, their individual skills and their career plans, MPs may pursue different roles both 
in and outside of parliament. For example, work patterns of MPs focusing more on 
parliamentary work, or more on their constituencies differ significantly (Patzelt 1997).  
What unites most of these studies is that while they are looking at MPs’ typical roles, they 
are ignoring one central benchmark most members of parliament have: their party and their 
parliamentary party group. The systematic neglect of the question of what impact the 
membership in a particular party group might have on a MP’s behaviour is surprising as it 
contrasts with some empirical findings on several legislature: Isaksson and Akademi’s (1994) 
quantitative longitudinal analysis Party Behaviour in the Finnish Parliament demonstrates 
how a party’s position in parliament affects its behaviour. Opposition parties acted foremost 
as vote-seekers, showing strong activity in plenary sessions and in employing (unsuccessful) 
roll-call votes. In contrast, the members of the governing coalition focused on committee 
work where they acted unanimously to ensure that their own bills became law. Based on 
quantitative analysis of Belgian MP’s behaviour, De Winter (1997, pp.129) claims that the 
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use of the various parliamentary tools, such as voting, debate and control, “is largely 
determined by party, and especially by its governmental status and ideological profile”. 
Research on the Austrian Parliament further underlines the impact that partisanship and a 
party’s position in parliament might have on the party group’s behaviour. As Müller and 
colleagues (2001) indicate, there are significant differences in the way members of opposition 
and governing parties, as well as of smaller and larger party groups, focus on one role or the 
other and these roles might change – along with the party groups’ fate in parliament – over 
the course of several legislative periods.2 Both Jenny and Müller’s findings on Austrian MPs 
(2008) and Isaksson and Akademi’s (1994, pp.102) empirical results on Finnish MPs 
underline a particular active role of Green Party opposition MPs that could – amongst other 
reasons – have its cause in the party’s history in the grass roots movement. Their findings are 
backed by analyses of party group behaviour in British local government that suggests that 
the specific partisan world-view does influence a party group’s votes (Leach & Copus 2004). 
First results of a study explaining party cohesion in the House of Lords from a social-
psychological angle through the party group members’ ‘belongingness’3 further underline the 
important impact party culture might have on its members’ behaviour and choice of 
strategies.  
The idea that there might be more to party-cohesion and strategic decision making in 
parliament than a strong whip is supported by a third strand of research that focuses on the 
socio-demographic aspects of legislative careers, their impact on the selection and election 
process and the representativeness of those finally elected. Research in political 
representation has been a well-established and geographically widespread strand of political 
science for several decades (Best & Cotta 2000b, Patzelt 1999). By analysing the 
interdependence of social and political change and changes in the composition of the 
legislative bodies it aims – amongst other issues – to analyse if the MPs’ social bias will have 
an impact on their legislative behaviour (Best & Cotta 2000a,Kavanagh 1992, Norris & 
Lovenduski 1995). Most of the studies focusing on the background of MPs are looking at the 
MPs as a group, detached from their individual parties. This is surprising, as the composition 
of party groups may differ significantly from the point of view of their members’ gender, 
education, occupational background, religion etc. and many legislatures provide this data 
sorted by the MPs’ partisanship (Norris & Lovenduski 1995, Ismayr 2000, Saalfeld 1995). 
However, findings as to what extent these variances – which after all are only proxy-variables 
for individual socialization – really do make a difference if it comes to drafting and 
implementing political ideas, are inconclusive. This applies even to the very well researched 
question of how significant the representation of women MPs in parliament is on 
policymaking.4 While the analysis of party groups in the German Bundestag indicated that 
social homogeneity is not a useful indicator to predict party cohesion (Saalfeld 1995, pp.218), 
other strands of research claim that the social background of legislators does influence their 
attitude and behaviour (Norris 1997, p. 6f., Wängnerud 2000, Best & Cotta 2000a, p.18, 
Hazan & Rahat 2006, p.371).  
The following case study on opposition in the Bavarian State Parliament shows that in 
contrast to some of the theoretical models discussed above there are great variations as to how 
opposition party groups behave within one political system.  
Bavaria as case study for party interaction on a territorial level 
Amongst Germany’s sixteen federal states, Bavaria has been, and still is playing a special role 
in Germany’s history and politics. With its roots reaching back as far as 555, Bavaria, which 
became a Kingdom in 1806 and a republic in 1919 (Free State of Bavaria), unites three big 
historical-political traditional regions with very distinctive identities: Franconia in the North 
and Swabia in the West were predominantly protestant but quite heterogeneous regarding the 
levels of agriculture and industrialisation. In contrast, the large territory of Old Bavaria was 
predominantly catholic, clearly dominated by agriculture and not reached by industrialisation 
after the Second World War (Mintzel 1987a). Despite of discussions on how exactly those 
cleavages were reconciled (Falter 1982, 1988, Gebhardt 1986, Mintzel 1987a, 1987b) it is 
  
4 
undisputed, that the state’s long history of independence has contributed to a strong regional 
identity and a distinct political culture. The beneficiary of this development has been the 
‘Bavarian State Party’, the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU). Apart from a three 
year break from 1954-1957, the CSU has been in government since 1945 and has ruled with 
absolute majority from 1962-2008. The party’s predominant role and the hegemonic structure 
of the Bavarian sub-system contravene the “cross-party mode” concept developed  for 
political decision making in the German Bundestag (King 1976, pp.21). It is unclear whether 
common findings on parliamentary opposition are applicable to the Bavarian State Parliament, 
as most of them have been developed in the face of coalition governments in the Bundestag. 
It is common opinion that parliamentary opposition acts within a frame defined by a triad 
of the opposition tasks: critique of the government, control of the government and presenting 
an alternative option to the electorate (Sternberger 1956, pp.134). Research in 
parliamentarianism as well as the international comparison of party politics, and research into 
elites is dominated by theses heralding the co-operation of opposition members of parliament 
with those of the governing party or parties (Helms 1997, pp.45f.). Quite often, the 
opposition’s constructive cooperative behaviour towards legislative drafts of the government, 
and society’s pressure to solve complex issues consensually, achieve the joint resolution of 
problems. Taking into consideration that several of those resolutions reflect oppositional ideas, 
some researchers even postulate a co-governing of opposition (von Beyme 1998, Sebaldt 
1992a, 1992b). This oppositional trend to co-operate is equally evident in parliaments that – 
such as the British House of Commons or the National Diet of Japan – are governed by one 
party only (Helms 1997, pp.200, Inoguchi 2008, pp.127). 
Based on these findings, it seemed plausible to expect cooperative behaviour of the 
opposition in the Bavarian State Parliament towards the absolute majority of the CSU. The 
continuing hegemonic role of the CSU underlines this hypothesis: In the light of permanently 
disillusioning election results, there was hardly any hope for the opposition parties to take 
power.5 The ‘alternative function’ as one of the classical opposition tasks thus seemed more 
or less irrelevant. In contrast, given the unequivocal majority during the past decades the only 
way to influence politics in the Bavarian State Parliament seemed to be co-operation.  
Methodological approach 
To overcome the institutional focus of classical theories on parliamentary opposition, this 
research sought to embed party interaction in the Bavarian State Parliament in a wider 
context. Apart from looking at the institutional framing of decision making in this assembly, 
several other factors that might affect the behaviour of party groups were considered. In line 
with studies on parliamentary decision making in the German Bundestag, which had shown 
that the complex interaction of political constellations and action strategies can best be 
analysed by working multi-dimensionally (von Beyme 1998, Sebaldt 1992a), the research 
combined qualitative and quantitative methods. This contained a thorough analysis of the 
socio-demographic background of all assembly members, grouped by partisanship, a detailed 
literature review and a media- analysis on the party’s history in- and outside parliament. This 
An analysis of any implications the institutional setting might have on the opposition party 
group’s abilities to take the government to account complemented the initial framing. 21 
qualitative interviews with members of the Bavarian State Parliament (MBSP) explored the 
interaction between the party groups further. In contrast to other interview projects that 
focused on the MP as an individual (Müller et al. 2001, Searing 1994, Patzelt 1993, 1995), the 
interview questions concentrated on differences between party groups and their behaviour in 
parliament. Issues explored in particular were the party groups’ image and functioning, and 
the interviewees’ judgment of the opposition parties’ efforts.  
In order to assess the actual impact of the parliamentary opposition on state legislation the 
research further contained a quantitative analysis of all initiatives (legal bills, proposals, 
amendments etc.) the parliament handled within its four-year session. A qualitative detailed 
analysis of selected legal bills that took media reports, comments of pressure groups, plenary 
debates and discussions in all committees involved into account, complemented the research. 
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One aim of this research was to explore in detail, how opposition parties influence the 
majority’s decision-making with respect to legal bills. Consequently, instead of taking a 
random sample of legal bills (Sebaldt 1992a, von Beyme 1998), the analysis was limited to 
topics where both the majority (either the government or the CSU party group) and at least 
one of the opposition parties had provided a draft-bill. Based on those guidelines, nine topics 
emerged which were addressed in 21 (out of 181) draft-bills. 
The analysis focused on the 13th electoral term (1994-1998). This period is set long enough 
in the past to allow completeness for both the parliament’s archive and the archives of interest 
groups involved.6 At the same time, it is not too distant as that the interviewees would not 
have vividly remembered this period of politics. Additionally, this timeframe allowed to 
judge the interactions of the governing majority and opposition parties in the context of 
German national politics since the mid 1990s – a period no longer directly influenced by the 
unification process but not yet impacted by the Green Party’s first participation of 
government in the Bundestag in 1998. The analysis was restricted to the three party groups 
represented in this term: CSU, Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens7, which since 1986 had 
started to replace the previous third party in the assembly, the liberal Free Democratic Party 
(FDP). 
Institutional Framing of Party Interaction 
Amongst other factors that are distinctive for the political system of Bavaria,8 the state’s so-
called “improved system of mixed voting” has been particularly beneficial for the CSU’s 
hegemonic role. This additional member system contains of two separate votes (the first one 
for a constituency representative, the second one for a representative to be picked from a 
party list, thus allowing more voter participation). In a simplified description, the system, 
used uniquely in Bavaria, effectively favours mass parties over smaller ones by accumulating 
both votes when determining a party’s share of seats (Hübner 1979, Aulehner 1991, Ender & 
Schultze 1991, Jung & Rieger 1995). For several decades, this has resulted in a very strong 
CSU party group that often exceeded the necessary absolute majority of 103 seats by 20-30 
seats, a medium sized group of SPD members (with around 70 seats) and one much smaller 
third party group that very rarely counted more than 15 members. The different size of the 
party groups has a severe impact on partisan representation in the various specialist 
committees. For the 13th electoral term, the CSU had won 120 seats, the SPD 70. SPD 
members chaired four out of 12 committees and the party was present with at least six MBSPs 
in each of the committees, allowing each representative some degree of specialisation within 
the particular policy area. In contrast, the 14 member strong Green party group could send 
only one MBSP in each committee who then was the sole representative of his party’s point 
of view on any issue discussed. 
Though the Parliament’s Standing Orders formally provide for various ways to take the 
government to account, many measures (e.g. the right of any MBSP to summon a member of 
government in front of a plenary session or a committee meeting) need the approval of the 
majority of votes, and thus the governing party. The option to set up an inquiry committee to 
investigate issues that are of public concern, formally requires only the support of 20% of 
MBSPs (Art 25/1 BV). However, simply by supporting any initiative to set up such a 
committee, the majority will gain the right to set the agenda, name the chair, and set the 
number of committee members. This usually allows the governing party to remain in charge 
of the investigation and to keep a 2/3 majority within the committee which is essential for the 
decision to exclude the public from listening to the debate (Rausch 1977, p.93; Rothemund 
1986, p.55).  
The Party Group Members’ Socio-demographic Background 
The assembly’s handbook for the 13th session (Bayerischer Landtag, 1996) provides brief 
biographies for each MBSP with details on their sex, age, religious affiliation, marital- and 
family status, education and their previous job(s). Further details are given on the MBSPs’ 
former engagement in other political arenas, for example in local assemblies or interest 
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groups. This data was analysed along party lines and contrasted with similar data available for 
the Bundestag (Schindler, 1999). It became evident that while there are some distinct 
differences between the three party groups, the State Parliament is overall a very homogenous 
assembly (Steinack 2007a, 88ff.). Particularly the biographies of the members of the two 
larger party groups, CSU and SPD, share many similarities. 89% of the CSU and 69% of SPD 
MBSPs were male, the majority of them were married with children, and roughly half of each 
group had been employed in public institutions prior to becoming an MBSP. Representatives 
over the age of 50 dominated in both groups.9 
In contrast, the Green party group was gender-balanced and their MBSPs were at average 
a decade younger with none of the men and only 25% of female MBSPs over the age of 50. 
Despite these differences, the Greens, who in the Bundestag were a quite distinct group, far 
less religious, far better educated, and far less likely to be married, by and large complied 
with a traditional life-style in Bavaria. Most of them were married (though only 37% of the 
women had children), around 70% were members of either the catholic or the protestant 
church, and with three farmers amongst them, they could – alike the CSU - claim agrarian 
credibility, while their Social-Democrat counterparts who had neither farmers (nor members 
of the working class) amongst their representatives, lacked this link.  
Before becoming a MBSP, in general, both SPD and CSU members had undergone a long 
path of inner-party qualification, 41% of the SPD-members had been engaged in trade unions. 
Similar to their CSU colleagues, the majority of SPD MBSPs could build upon previous 
experience of representing voters on a local or regional level. Among the 73 representatives,10 
45 (61%) had been councillors within their village, city or district; five had been mayors, 
some in cities as big as Munich; two each had held posts as district governors or had 
represented their party in the Bundestag and the European Parliament.11  
The Greens in general enjoy the reputation to focus far less on making a party-career a 
pre-requisite for candidateship and to support candidates who, albeit previous engagement in 
areas related to the party’s political aims, are not actually party members.12  Despite this 
standing, 11 out of the 16 had been party members for more then ten years, some even were 
founding members of the party, and a further two had a party affiliation of at least five years. 
Ten (62%) had gained previous experience as councillors. 
The Party Groups’ Historical, Ideological and Cultural Background 
With respect to tradition and modernity as the main pillars of Bavarian identity and politics, 
CSU, SPD and Greens show very different roots and developments. 
The CSU, founded after the Second World War with the aim to unite protestant and 
catholic conservative voters, managed after some initial struggles to integrate large groups of 
society, a task certainly facilitated by the fact that the party operates only in Bavaria and thus 
could tailor both its structure and its programme to the state’s specific interests and needs. 
Though originally focused on self-employed famers, craftsmen and merchants, the party 
successfully managed to modernise itself (Mintzel 1998, p.121) and to secure the support of 
new voter groups, in particular amongst salaried employees and public servants. Since the 
1960s the CSU has managed to develop its profile as a party that promotes modernisation 
while at the same time protecting a particular Bavarian identity (Mintzel 1998, Sutherland 
2001, Hepburn 2008). Slogans such as “Bei uns in Bayern: CSU” (Here in Bavaria: CSU) 
underline the party’s self-image and reputation as “Bavarian State Party”. It has a widespread 
net of local branches and holds the majority in many local authorities. Inside parliament, the 
group enjoyed the reputation to be highly hierarchical and extremely shut off towards 
outsiders or the public while being closely interlocked with the government in a “Unity of 
action” (Steinack 2007, pp.81ff.)  
Competing with the CSU for votes from the centre ground is the SPD. Founded in 1863 
and re-established after the Second World War, this most traditional of all German parties 
remained tied to pre-war settings (Mintzel 1998, pp.115ff.). Dissimilar to other German 
states, the party’s Manifesto of Godesberg in 1959, which initiated and symbolised the change 
from a socialist labour party to a mass party, could not trigger new voter groups in Bavaria. 
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The SPD could not adapt to the post-war changes in the state’s rural-catholic society and was 
unable to benefit from Bavaria’s late period of industrialisation that – unlike industrialisation 
periods in the Ruhr region a century ago – did not go along with a growing mass of working 
poor, but quickly generated a rather well off lower middle class. Since 1957, the Bavarian 
SPD has been continuously in opposition, which is a Europe wide record of parliamentary 
defeats.13 This downfall went along with a loss of party members14 and local branches, though 
the party still holds a fair share of local councillors, majors and heads of regional districts.15 
The Greens had first entered the State Parliament in 1986. In order to win votes, the party 
originally pointed out its “otherness”. Founded in 1980 as catch basin of left-wing protest 
groups, united by their critical approach towards the system, but in other respects focused on 
a widely different range of topics and interests, the Greens perceived themselves initially as 
“anti-party” (Raschke 1993, pp.42ff.). They express this positioning, for example, by 
stressing the importance of grass-roots democracy, by electing a team of spokespeople instead 
of voting for one party leader, and by fighting traditional male-dominated party-structures 
with a “zipper-system” of alternating female and male candidates on party-lists. Until well in 
the 1990s, discussions between the party’s fundamental and more realistic factions dominated 
the party’s public appearance. Even though the electorate might not always support the 
incoherent way their party presented itself in public, party supporters widely acknowledged 
the Green’s factionalism gave the party extra credibility with respect to looking at political 
problems from various angles (Raschke 1993, pp.202ff.). During the time of assessment, the 
Green’s Bavarian branch stood out for its strong emphasis on ecological matters and gender 
equality, while lacking the political radicalism, other regional branches may display (Raschke 
1993, pp.266ff.).  
Opposition behaviour in the Bavarian State Parliament 
Based on the MBSPs’ statements and underlined by the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of parliamentary papers the research identified several levels and strategies of opposition 
influence. These are distinguished by a specific combination of places and modes of 
opposition influence: 
• The strategy of power-oriented politics focused on confrontation in the plenary and 
on mobilising the public outside parliament. 
• The matter-of-fact co-operation sought to change things within parliament through 
co-operation in committees and by trying to influence decision making in non-public 
areas aside from the committees.  
The analysis showed that both strategies could cause the CSU to change its position. 
However, the opposition parties’ success was normally limited to small objective changes in 
the majority’s legal bills, and the CSU-majority refused stronger programmatic changes to its 
politics by the SPD and the Green Party.  
Table 1: Strategies of opposition influence in the Bavarian State Parliament 
 Mode of contest Place of contest 
Content-oriented politics Cooperation Committees and informal 
contacts within parliament 
Power-oriented politics Confrontation Plenary, Media and public 
outside parliament  
Places and Instruments of opposition influence 
Analysing the nine legislative procedures revealed that the opposition chose very different 
modes and places of contest depending on the topic. Those can be distinguished between 
content-oriented (or matter-of-fact oriented) and power-oriented politics and public and non-
public space.  
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Instruments used for power-oriented politics were entirely public and mostly used outside the 
parliament and the plenary sessions. The focus of those instruments that related to objective, 
content-oriented politics was the non-public area of decision making as well as the (public) 
meetings of the parliament’s specialist committees.  
The lack of instruments used for power-oriented politics in the non-public area of 
decision-making can be explained by two factors: as committee-sessions in the Bavarian State 
Parliament are open for the public, the MBSPs’ space for non-public interaction is much 
smaller than in other assemblies. A further obstacle is the absolute majority of the CSU 
government whose unity – unlike coalition-governments in other assemblies – is much harder 
to split over controversial topics. 
Although the interviewees did not label the two different levels of influence (political 
power/objective content) explicitly as such, their comments and the analysis of the empirical 
material showed the use of different strategies in different places: 
(i) The interviewees thought the plenary to be a place of confrontation where MBSPs meet 
under the prefix of party-politics.16 Political content was discussed only during the 
second (and more rarely third) reading of legal bills. Aside from this, the opposition 
parties used the opportunity to scrutinise the government’s politics during question 
time. Results of a qualitative analysis of plenary debates in the second half of 199617 
underline the interviewees’ perception. 
(ii) In contrast, discussions in committees showed a much higher influence by 
representatives of the SPD and the Green party. Apart from legislative bills which, in 
their majority were introduced by the government, more than 70% of all parliamentary 
initiatives discussed during this election period (most prominently amendments to legal 
bills) were initiated by the opposition. In line with this MBSPs highlighted that 
opposition influence could most easily be achieved in committee meetings (Steinack 
2007, pp.160ff.). However, the committees’ recommendations are non-binding; the 
final decision whether an initiative will be adopted or not is taken by the plenary. 
(iii) The third pillar of opposition influence was to appeal to and integrate the public even 
prior to initiating a legal bill. The interviewees rated the informal influence that a party 
could gain outside parliament as the most important factor for influencing governmental 
decisions (Steinack 2007:181ff.). Most relevant are contacts to pressure groups prior to 
the preparation of legal bills. Once the legislative process has formally started, MBSPs 
try to influence voters by launching press releases and media-reports. In exceptional 
cases, they may use this to an extent that parts of the public will support the opposition 
party’s position by launching a petition for a referendum, which – if successful – might 
alter the majority’s decision. 
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Table 2: Places and Instruments of opposition influence  













   Discussions of experts from all 
parliamentary party groups aside 
from committee and plenary sessions 
 Lobbying of stakeholders to convince 
the political majority 













 Proposals to amend the majority’s 
draft bills 
 Hearing of experts and lobbyists 
 Plenary discussions 
 
 Launch of press-releases in order to alert 
the media and the public 
 Use of the media by lobbyists to support 
party positions 
 Petitions for referendums (sometimes 
jointly with lobbyists)  
 Initiative to discuss current topics in 
parliament in order to confront the 
government with the opposition’s point of 
view  
 * Though committee sessions formally are public, visitors and journalists quite often do not attend. 
Opposition Strategies to enforce political interests 
The public-oriented discussion of political topics in the plenary and outside parliament on the 
one hand and the matter-of-fact discussion with colleagues in or prior to committee meetings 
on the other hand are two contrasting benchmarks of opposition strategies. Analysing 
legislative procedures demonstrated that opposition MBSPs used both paths equally. Out of 
the nine procedures examined, four each were clearly dominated by power-oriented politics or 
content-orientated politics, the remaining procedure, a revision of Bavaria’s nature 
conservation law, was discussed on both levels. In this context, certain topics or interests 
inevitably entailed certain political action strategies: 
(i) The MBSPs chose the strategy of discussing an issue more content oriented if the topic 
was relatively complex and could not be communicated easily to the media. This 
applied for example to a legislative procedure which aimed to reduce wrongfully 
granted subsidies in housing or a procedure intending to change the existing law on 
pollution control. The opposition MBSPs also used this content-oriented approach for 
an initiative to make the promotion of sport compulsory for local governments where 
parliamentary majority and opposition parties tacitly co-operated. The main base for 
this party-comprehensive co-operation was that the legislative matter in question was an 
issue that was of general interest that none of the parties covered programmatically, and 
that the topic was not attributed to a specific electorate.  
(ii) In contrast, the party groups used the power-oriented strategy for topics with a high 
relevance for society and strong links to at least one of the involved party’s programme. 
The analysed legislative procedures linked to this strategy mostly dealt with topics that 
were linked to a party’s Weltanschauung (world view) on this matter, such as gender 
equality, the integration of migrants, or the use of genetic engineering. Furthermore, 
discussions on those topics could be reduced to clear statements and a few key words.  
Party related differences in the opposition’s appearance 
When comparing the two opposition party groups, particular party-specific patterns became 
evident: The interviewees mentioned several characteristics in the party groups’ way of 
presenting themselves. Especially CSU MBSPs thought their Green colleagues to be far more 
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undaunted, agile and committed than the members of the SPD. Several of them claimed that it 
had been the Greens, which had confronted the government more often. In contrast, the 
interviewees described the SPD members as inhibited and less dynamic but more eager to co-
operate. At the same time, the evaluation of the nine legislative procedures shows that SPD 
and Greens pursued their political goals with different strategies.  
The interviewees described the Green MBSPs quite vividly. Many of them perceived them 
as ‘very intense personalities’18, who left both an individual and colourful imprint. Several 
MBSPs thought this feature to be indirectly proportional to a party group’s size, because in 
their opinion the Green MBSPs’ exposed position in committees, was the main reason why 
their appearance gained profile and seemed more disputatious.19 A Social Democrat explained 
that the single Green committee member’s request to speak already put that person into an 
exposed counter-position to the other party group’s speakers in this committee.20 Particularly 
CSU-members were impressed how the Greens managed to cover the various issues 
discussed.21 In focusing on a few issues which they underlined by competent argument, they 
managed to gain a far sharper programmatic outline than their SPD colleagues did. Several 
interviewees labelled the Green MBSPs as ‘real opposition’ whose successes in articulating 
alternative positions had contributed significantly to the sharpening of the political profile of 
the party group as a whole.22 They had thus managed to convert the burden of being sole-
representatives of a position in committee meetings into an advantage. In particular, the fact 
that they did not have to go through a time-consuming and diluting co-ordination procedure in 
working groups mirroring the committees, like the two larger party groups, allowed the Green 
parliamentarians a more impertinent and agile opposition strategy.23 
According to SPD interviewees, the Green MBSPs had another big bonus: their more 
efficient communication structures and better, partly more creative, contacts in the media.24 In 
contrast, they thought the description of their own party members in the media as ‘rather 
boring’25 – despite the party’s ambitions and political goals. Even though the SPD had more 
staff to do research and prepare political statements and despite its large media office, several 
SPD interviewees perceived the party group’s external communications and presentations as 
inadequate. One Social Democrat complained: ‘It is one of the biggest grievances within the 
party group that our public relations are too bad. If the people only would understand our 
good intentions they couldn’t vote [for] any other party but the SPD’26. In his opinion, the 
main reason for the lack of response his party got in public, were the out-dated 
communication structures:  
‘Similar to other mass organisations, such as churches and trade unions over a long 
period [the SPD has] successfully used communication structures which in today’s 
communication society are relatively unsuccessful. (...) The Green’s advantage is that 
they never had such communication structures. This is most evident for organisations 
such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International; from the very beginning, their way to 
communicate aimed at today’s structure of media communication. If I want to point 
out, that the chemical industry causes too much pollution I don’t write a long paper and 
send it off to all editors; I won’t organise a conference either. Instead, I tie myself to a 
chimney and get the public attention that I need. (...) In particular the Bavarian SPD is 
still formed by communication structures used 50 years ago.’27 
Overall, the SPD parliamentarians didn’t gain much profile in the interviews. Keywords as 
‘creative’, individual’ or ‘unconventional’ weren’t used. In the interviewees’ descriptions the 
party group more seemed like a passive group formed by the spirit of the civil service with 
many MBSPs exhausted through long party careers and only a few actively involved in 
opposition work. A SPD parliamentarian mentioned that in his opinion the party group was 
lacking younger members and that the long opposition period would suffocate any motivation 
for a personnel or political renewal: 
‘The SPD isn’t attractive for younger or more dynamic people (...) You have to 
imagine: if someone becomes a teacher at 25 and then joins the SPD he can become a 
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member of his local party group but even if he attends regularly this will get boring at 
some point. For a teacher it’s financially attractive to become a member of the state 
parliament, even if he doesn’t develop his career there any further. But once he is in, 
it’s important to get re-elected. He basically needs to defend his constituency and needs 
to make sure that he won’t loose ground within his party, but this rarely happens: once 
you made it you stay there. They [the MBSPs] stick to one basic attitude – don’t 
change anything as otherwise you might get run over [by new developments]. If we 
admit a few dynamic youngsters what will happen to us?’28 
Externally, the SPD party group tried to leave a much more homogenous impression than the 
Green Party that was mainly justified by the electorate’s expectations.29 As during the 13th 
session the SPD could send six or more members in any of the committees, the party group 
was able to divide topics between several delegates while focusing on a more intensive 
preparation of the issues discussed. These expert opinions were then discussed in internal 
party working groups where extremist and outsider positions were smoothed down in favour 
of a binding majority opinion that was then presented externally.30 The price the SPD paid for 
party unity was the abandonment of extreme positions that would have allowed them to draw 
clearer borders and to gain a clearer profile with respect to the CSU. According to 
representatives of Greens and CSU, the SPD particularly had a much weaker profile in 
content-related questions than the Green Party. At the same time, the SPD party group 
showed much more readiness to co-operate with the majority and according to CSU-
representatives was involved more frequently in political decision making. As one CSU 
politician voiced, in contrast to the Greens, one could get along with the Social Democrats; 
‘and it’s easier to get along with them. Even if there are a few extreme positions within the 
SPD the larger number of representatives guarantees the sum of opinions to be well-
balanced.’31  Correspondingly, several SPD interviewees had stressed their group’s strong 
focus on political realism and the resulting insight that not everything can be realised that 
might be programmatically desirable.32 
The opposition party groups’ strategic preferences in legislation  
The interviewees’ remarks on the appearance of Social Democrat and Green MBSPs are 
consistent with the way both parliamentary party groups handled the selected bills’ passage 
through parliament. The analyses of the genesis of these bills were used as the second central 
indicator for the opposition parties’ strategic preferences. The parties handled four of the 
topics by using a content related strategy with none or very limited media-involvement, and in 
three of these cases, the SPD had initiated the draft-bill. The Greens had initiated only one 
such draft-bill and this was the only case (out of the nine topics examined) where there had 
been a governmental draft-bill prior to a draft provided by the opposition. This delayed 
initiative of the Greens indicates that the eco-party did not give priority to solving content-
oriented topics by cooperative discussion. 
In contrast, the initiative for all four bills that were dealt with an element of public 
confrontation came from a Green draft bill that subsequently triggered an initiative of the 
governmental majority. The SPD had contributed only to one of the legislative procedures of 
that kind with its own draft – a bill to guarantee gender equality in the public service.33  
Finally, the proceedings to change the bill for the Bavarian Nature Conservation Law is an 
example for a mixture between the content-oriented strategy of cooperative discussion and the 
strategy of influence by public confrontation: Even though the Greens discussed this draft bill 
extensively in party publications, the debate on the planned amendments did not reach the 
wider public.  
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Table 3: The Opposition Party Groups’ Strategic Preferences  
 Confrontation Cooperation Hybrid 
SPD [Bill on the Identification of 
genetically non-modified 
edibles from Bavaria]* 
Bill on gender equality for 
women and men in public 
service 
Change to the Bavarian 
Municipal Code to make 
promotion of sport for the 
masses compulsory for local 
governments 
Change to the Bavarian 
Pollution Control Bill  
Bill for the cut-rate sale of 





Bill on the Identification of 
genetically non-modified 
edibles from Bavaria 
Bill on gender equality for 
women and men in public 
service 
Change to the Bill on 
elections to local 
governments  
Change to the Bavarian 
Hunting Bill 
Change to the Bill to Reduce 
Misguided Subventions in 
Supported Housing in 
Bavaria 
Change to the 
Bavarian Nature 
Conservation Bill  
 * The SPD had adopted the Green’s draft bill 
Analysing those legislative processes shows that the Greens preferred a strategy of influence 
by public confrontation in order to implement their political ideas. In contrast, the SPD 
members focused on a content-oriented strategy and tried to achieve changes within 
parliament - in so doing they normally sought to co-operate in committee meetings. This was 
true even when the SPD had not submitted a draft bill for the topic in question, such as 
changes to the Nature Conservation Law, where SPD MBSPs submitted plenty proposals for 
amendments. SPD members further acted as intermediaries in CSU and Green MBSPs’ 
conflictive and highly emotionalised debates on amending the Hunting Law. The SPD 
group’s cooperative engagement in those matters confirms results of a quantitative analysis of 
all legislative proposals for the 13th legislative period that showed that significantly more 
amendments submitted by SPD members than by Green parliamentarians got the majority’s 
approval (Steinack 2007, pp.135). In contrast, the Green MBSPs abstained from discussing 
topics where their party group had not submitted an amendment and did not try to act as 
intermediaries. 
Explanations for partisan differences  
Table 4 gives an overview of the identified structural, socio-demographic and party-related 
impact factors. How do these relate to the opposition party groups’ different behaviour 
patterns, and how does this fit in with the different theories on parliamentary opposition and 
findings on partisan and socio-demographic aspects of decision making in parliament? 
  
13 
Table 4: Impact factors on the opposition groups’ behaviour  
 Factor SPD Green Party 








committee members  
At least 6 MBSPs per specialist 
committee which allows to 
specialise on topics 
Only one MBSP per specialist 
committee who represents the party 
group’s opinion but can’t specialise 




Well educated, middle aged, 
male-dominated. Ca. 50% 
previously employed in public 
institutions  
Well educated, younger, gender-











Legislative Career Candidates need right kind of 
background and pedigree, only 
given to those who have served 
in the party for longer periods 
There are multiple avenues into 
politics; party-membership no 
prerequisite for MBSP candidates 
 
Party tradition Labour Movement of Imperial 
Germany (1870s) 
Grass-root Movement & Extra-
Parliamentary Opposition (late 
1960s) 
Political self-Image Catch-All Party ‘Anti-Party’ 
Programmatic focus Moderate politics of the 
mainstream 
Combining of fundamental and 
realistic positions 




Long standing experience in 
opposition has lead to 
disillusionment and resignation 
Relatively new to the business with 
limited experience of opposition’s 
course of life 
Communication 
structures 
Dated and old-fashioned 
Statements for certain topics 
are made by the party group’s 
official speakers on the topic 
Contemporary with unusual 
approaches  
Open access to the party group’s 
media office for all MBSPs is a 









Culture of discussion 
within party group 
Personal differences are dealt 
with internally 
Aims to find common standing 
on each issue discussed 
Personal differences within the 
party group are discussed widely 
and publicly 
Several strands of opinion tolerated  
 
Structural and institutional explanations 
Dahl (1996a), Blondel (1996) and Helms (2004) highlighted the impact different political 
systems might have on an opposition’s behaviour and choice of strategy. The findings 
outlined above indicate that the effect institutional settings have on a micro-level, within one 
assembly, on different opposition groups can shape their behaviour just as much. In the case 
of Bavaria, the election system with its tendency to facilitate a large majority and two 
opposition groups of very different size seems to be a central reason. The SPD’s significantly 
bigger number of MBSPs allowed the group to focus on a more content-oriented strategy of 
cooperative discussion. With at least six delegates in any of the parliament’s committees the 
party was able to develop experts for many of the topics discussed and to rely on those 
experts’ knowledge in the decision making process. At the same time, the number of MBSPs 
involved in each of those decisions required complex and time-consuming coordination 
within the parliamentary party group and some of the interviewees stressed that balancing 
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interests within the party group quite regularly lead to a watering down of their political 
intentions, which made it harder to increase the party’s profile in the public.34  
In contrast, the Green party group’s fourteen members did not need complex coordination, 
as they could send only one MBSP into each of the specialist committees who then 
represented the party-group’s opinion. At the same time, they had to deal with the handicap 
that for topics that are more marginal the party group simply lacked the capacity to 
accumulate expert knowledge and thus was less able to develop a content-focused profile. 
Among the range of topics discussed in the committees, the Green MBSPs would 
consequently pick only few items. In doing so, they deliberately focused on subjects which 
were likely to produce a high response from the public and which would sharpen the party’s 
profile as a powerful and punchy opposition.35  
Why these structural reasons can explain the SPD’s stronger focus on content, they fail to 
justify why the party group did not develop an equally strong pattern of competitive 
behaviour, similar to the one displayed by the Green politicians.  
Socio-demographic aspects 
Amongst the factors considered, the MBSPs’ socio-demographic background seems to 
contribute least to the different ways the opposition parties behaved in parliament, thus 
questioning Best and Cotta’s thesis of “representation by identity” (200a, pp.519) and 
contravening findings by Norris (1997, pp.6) and Hazan and Rahat (2006, pp.XXX). The 
party groups resembled each other a great deal with the gender-balanced, younger appearance 
of the Greens being the only significant difference to the male-dominated SPD and CSU 
groups. However, the stronger presence of women did not lead the Greens to be more 
vigorous in supporting women’s rights in general and none of the interviewees has 
highlighted this female component as an outstanding feature of the Green’s appearance. It 
thus seems unlikely that this factor caused the party group to be more vocal and competitive 
by publicly highlighting the party’s legislative aims. 
Equally unconvincing seems another explanation, given by CSU- and SPD-interviewees 
alike, who linked the SPD group’s focus on more realistic solutions and its greater willingness 
to cooperate to its’ MBSP’s frequent previous experience as councillors on a local level.36 
However, as an almost equal percentage of both Green (62%) and SPD (61%) MBSPs had 
gained previous experience as councillors, this argument does not stand ground. Again, it 
seems unlikely, that the SPD’s five (out of 73) representatives with previous experience as 
mayor should have influenced the party’s attitude enough to explain the significant 
differences in behaviour patterns between the two opposition parties.  
In contrast, the age differences between the Greens and the two other party groups seems 
to be a good factor for explaining different behaviour patterns. Men beyond their fifties 
dominated both SPD and CSU, and it can be assumed that their longer-standing experience in 
politics influenced the party internal discussions and shaped the way the party groups 
presented themselves in plenary and committee sessions and in the media. In comparison, the 
Greens totally lacked the influence of senior male politicians; the only two Green MBSPs 
beyond the age of 50 were female. Taking the Green’s history as a melting pot of all kinds of 
social movements into account, these MBSPs individual background was far more likely to be 
influenced by the ideals of the women’s or the peace-movement. Although by 1994 the 
Greens had become a constant in Bavarian State Politics they were employing action patterns 
acquired outside parliament. 
Party-specific aspects 
Far more important seem to be aspects that can – in a wider sense – be described as party-
specific, such as the party’s history, both in- and outside parliament, its ideology, and its 
internal culture of discussion.   
The SPD’s focus on a content-oriented strategy of cooperative discussion can be explained 
by its standing as a mass party that, building upon its pre-war tradition of promoting working-
class interest, has contributed to shaping politics both on a national level as well as in many 
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other German Länder for decades. In this role, the SPD stands in strong competition with the 
CSU when trying to win votes from the political mainstream. In order to succeed, both catch-
all parties have to avoid extreme positions; they mustn’t rely on idealist aims but must focus 
on solutions that are politically realistic. As a result, the political discussions of both CSU and 
SPD were inevitably more geared towards Realpolitik (real politics) than to political ideals. 
Adding to this are the decades some of the long-standing SPDs MBSPs had spent in 
opposition that had substantially dampened their hopes to achieve a fundamental change of 
politics. Acting along the motto, ‘I want to see success and not only defeats’37 they might 
have simply been more ready to compromise than their Green colleagues. Although this 
strategy was successful as it allowed the SPD to modify some of the majority’s drafts along 
their own ideals, the party could not communicate this in the media as great achievement. 
Stuck in outdated communication structures, the party failed to get recognition as “real 
opposition” in Bavaria. 
In contrast, the Green’s preference for a strategy of influence by public confrontation can 
be related to the party’s origins in grassroots movements and the ideals of the extra-
parliamentary opposition of the late 1960s that formed the first years of the party in 
parliament. The Green ideal to be an ‘anti-party’ which aims to keep a check on the political 
system as such has faded while the party established itself in parliament. However, at least 
until the Greens first became part of a coalition government on national level (in 1998) the 
party’s electorate expected explicitly left-wing positions. This made it easy for the Bavarian 
Green party to distinguish itself very clearly from the CSU in the fields of security and home 
affairs, as well as agricultural and environmental policy. It did not harm the party’s profile 
that there were severe clashes between the party’s more realistic and more fundamental 
wings; its voters tolerated, and even anticipated this behaviour as part of the party’s specific 
culture.38 Even though the Green MBSPs’ public appearance in parliament during the 13th 
electoral term was mostly similar to the one displayed by the CSU and SPD MBSPs, many 
Green representatives still thought extra-parliamentary protest to be the right measure to gain 
attention and reach political change and they employed this attitude in their media-relations.39  
Aside of this, particularly the Green’s specific culture of discussion supported their 
MBSPs’ focus on a strategy of influence by public confrontation. Shortly after the start of the 
13th electoral term the party group members engaged in intensive internal party strife and 
discussed their clashing opinions on ‘proper opposition politics’ in the media extensively. The 
fact that the focus of their discussion was the question, how the Green representatives should 
handle access to the party group’s press office, underlines the MBSPs’ philosophy of keeping 
a high public profile by discussing things publicly.40 
Final Considerations and Outlook 
The empirical findings prove common theories propounding co-operation and confrontation 
as being the main pillars of opposition behaviour, as SPD and Greens within the Bavarian 
State Parliament employed both strategies alike. At the same time, this result underlines that 
different strategies can exist within one political system. It thus seems necessary to extend the 
theoretical approaches by Dahl (1996), Blondel (1997) and Helms (2004) by taking into 
account the impact institutional and structural regulations on a micro-level might have for 
different party-groups. The socio-demographic differences between the members of the Green 
party group and the MBSPs of the two mainstream parties CSU are limited. Of these 
differences only the Greens’ younger average age (which is related to many party-members 
background in grass-root movements, plausibly relates to the group’s more confrontational 
behaviour in- and outside parliament. Strong indicators that the Greens’ particular history 
might be the main driving force behind the party group’s more confrontational behaviour 
patterns are the initially highlighted findings by Jenny and Müller (2008) for Austria and 
Isaksson and Akademi (1994) for Finland. In both studies, the Greens stood out as more 
active and less conformist than the larger parties of the mainstream. 
It can be concluded that mono-causal explanations of opposition strategies falls short to take 
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Notes 
                                               
1  Kirchheimer (1980, p.410) distinguishes between parliamentary opposition, opposition as principle 
and a decaying of opposition as consequence of classical parliamentary cartel agreements. 
Oberreuter (1975) differs between issue-oriented ad-hoc opposition, cooperative opposition and 
competitive opposition. Steffani (1987) separates out loyal vs. fundamental opposition, 
parliamentary opposition vs. opposition outside of parliament without an explicit mandate of 
voters, and systematically vs. situation-orientated opposition that seems comparable to 
Oberreuter’s Ad-Hoc-Opposition. 
2  Amongst other results their extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of the behaviour of 
members of the Austrian National Parliament shows that while members of the governing parties 
focus on committee work, the first preference of the opposition MPs was the use of questions in 
plenary-sessions. In particular, the two smallest opposition parties, the Greens and the Liberal 
Forum, represented in parliament with nine MPs prioritized party-specific policy-areas over 
constituency work.  
3  See Russell (2008) who refers to Norton (2003) as main trigger for her research. 
4  Following Pitkin’s book on The Concept of Representation (1972), there has been a widespread 
discussion whether female MPs would be automatically “acting for” women and if a “critical 
mass” of women in parliament would change politics. For an overview and discussion of the most 
recent findings, see Celis and Childs (2008). 
5  The 2003 elections to the state parliament are symptomatic for the opposition’s limited chances to 
win: The slogan used by the Bavarian SPD, ‘Macht braucht Kontrolle’ (power needs control), sent 
clear signals that the party did not seek to come into government but aimed to prevent a 2/3 CSU 
majority. The 2008 slogan “Bayern, aber gerechter” (Bavaria, but more just) underlined the party’s 
new strategy of acknowledging that the CSU’s political achievements cannot be simply 
condemned as failures – though there would be room for (social-democratic) improvement. 
6 Governmental files were not available due to the general 30-year block up period; access to 
internal material produced by the party groups was limited. 
7 Though the merger of the former West German Green Party with the East German Civil Rights 
movement Bündnis 90, as formed in 1993, officially carries the name Bündnis 90/Die Grünen its 
members in the Bavarian State Parliament keep referring to themselves as ‘Greens’. 
8  To mention are, for example, the outstanding position of the First Minister who, opposed to his 
colleagues in the other German Länder, may not be forced out of office by a motion of no 
confidence (Ender & Schultze 1991:154, Mielke 1971, Rausch 1977). Additionally unique within 
the German federal system was Bavaria’s second chamber, the Senate with 60 members chosen 
amongst representatives of the trade, the industry, the agriculture, and religious and cultural 
groups. As the public felt it was outdated and did not promote democratic decision-making, it 
successfully petitioned in February 1998 for its abolition and the Bavarian Senate ceased to exist 
in 2000.  
9
  In the CSU 57% of males and 50% of females were over 50. For the SPD these figures were 68% 
for male and 41% for female MBSPs. 
10
  Eight MBSPs had left the State Parliament prematurely; one had died. As their biographies as well 
as those of their successors were included, the number of biographies analysed ads to n = 214 
(CSU: 120+4 successors; SPD: 70+3; Greens: 14+2; Independent: 1).  
11
  Amongst the CSU party group members, at least 66% had previous experience as councillors, a 
further 11% as mayors and 3% as district administrators. However, as the biographies of most 
frontbenchers only highlight their previous posts within government, but fail to mention any 
career-development outside parliament, it can safely be assumed that the actual numbers should 
read higher (own calculations, based on data provided in Bayerischer Landtag, 1996). 
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12  Among the 16 MBSPs representing the Greens during the 13th session, three weren’t party 
members. 
13  Even the CSU’s landslide loss of over 17% of votes in the 2008 election that forced the CSU to 
enter a coalition government for the first time in 47 years, did not revive the SPD. The 18.6% of 
votes the party managed to attract marks yet another historical lowest point on the Social 
Democrat’s long list of lost elections in Bavaria. URL: http://www.landtagswahl2008.bayern.de/ - 
official result, accessed 23 January 2009. 
14  The 1994 member figures for Bavaria were SPD: 104.526 SPD, CSU: 176.250 CSU, Greens: 
5.555 (Kießling 2004, p.74).  
15  Most prominently, Bavaria’s capital, Munich, has (apart from the years 1978-1984) been 
continuously governed by an SPD major since 1948.  
16 See interview 01-290101-B90/Grüne, line 80ff who explained: “Meeting in partisan armament 
limits your leeway. One needs to get started ahead of that (…) possibly even before issues are 
discussed in committees (…) Once the committee sessions are over you move on to the 
parliamentary part that will be slug out in front of the public and this narrows your influence. If the 
governing MBSPs have told you three times already in committee that they will not follow your 
suggestion and if they have underlined this with their own point of view they are not prepared to 
lose their face in public. You can’t expect wonders in plenary session”. 
17  Peter Raschke and Jens Kalke, University of Hamburg, who for the summer term 1999 ran a 
research seminar comparing plenary sessions in all German State Parliaments during the first half 
of 1996, provided this additional data.  
18  Interview 05-050201 SPD, line 274ff. 
19  See interview 01-290101 B90/Grüne, line 188f; Interview 09-150201 SPD, line 73ff. 
20  See interview 11-190201 SPD, line 120ff 
21  See interview 04-010201 CSU, line 198ff. 
22 See interview 04-010201 CSU, line 168ff; Interview 07-150201 CSU, line 218ff, Interview 13-
120301 CSU, line 248ff. 
23  Compare interviews 07-150201 CSU, line 227ff ., 05-050201 SPD, line 264ff. 
24  Compare interviews 05-050201 SPD, lines393ff ., 18-240401 SPD, line 202ff. 
25  Compare interview 18-240401 SPD, lines 200ff. 
26  Interview 05-050201-SPD, lines 385ff.  
27  Interview 05-050201 SPD, lines 393ff. 
28  Interview 05-050201 SPD, lines 500ff. 
29  See interview 21-151001 SPD, lines 239ff. 
30  Votes where MBSPs can decide independently without taking their party group’s guidance on a 
topic into account are very rare. Interviewees 21-151001 SPD (line 315) and 01-290101 
B90/Grüne (line 574) pointed out that if a topic was highly controversial within the party group 
there would be general agreement to try and not to discuss this topic with the other party groups if 
possible. 
31  Interview 10-160201 CSU, lines 263f. 
32  See interviews 08-150201 SPD, lines 31ff; 18-240401 SPD, lines 291ff, 303; 09-150201 SPD, 
lines 6ff. 
33  In a further legislative procedure relating to genetic engineering, the SPD party group had decided 
to support the Green’s initiative instead of submitting a proposal of its own. 
34  See interview 21-151001 SPD, line 315. 
35  See interview 17-190301 B90/Grüne, lines 225ff. 
36  Interviews 04-012001 CSU, lines194ff.; 08-150201 SPD, lines 31ff; 18-240401 SPD, lines 291ff, 
303; 09-150201 SPD, lines 6ff. 
37  Interview 08-150201 SPD, lines 187ff. 
38  According to Raschke (1993, p.203), having several competing wings was seen as healthy sign for 
the party’s plurality, heterogeneity and inner party democracy. 
39  During the session, Green MBSPs for example protested outside parliament against final storage of 
radioactive waste and blockaded a slaughterhouse where cattle, potentially infected with BSE, 
were culled.  
40  Having free access for all Green MBSPs to the party group’s media office was one of the key 
issues, which ignited a major internal and public discussion on the party group’s opposition 
strategy in 1996. See Steinack (2007, pp.81ff.) and ‘Fraktionschef und Pressesprecher beziehen 
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